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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LYNETTE D. NIELSEN, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
RUSSELL CLYDE NIELSEN, ] 
Defendant/Respondent. ] 
) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
> Case No. 890659-CA 
JURISDICTION OF COURT 
The Decree of Divorce from which this appeal is taken 
was signed by the court on October 6, 1989, and entered 
October 11, 1989. The Notice of Appeal was filed November 
3, 1989. 
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal in this 
matter by virtue of the Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, 
Section 1 et seq., Section 78-2A-1 et seq. Utah Code Amu 
(1953 as amended), and Rule 3 R. Utah Ct. App. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a final Decree of Divorce signed by 
Judge Gordon J. Low of the First Judicial District Court of 
Cache County, State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court committed error, given the 
16-year marriage of the parties, the disparate financial 
circumstances and earning ability of the parties, needs of 
the parties and relative standards of living of the parties, 
in awarding Lynette Nielsen only $300.00 per month alimony 
and limiting said alimony to a period of three years or 
until such time as Lynette Nielsen remarries, cohabits as 
provided by statute, or either party dies, whichever first 
occurs. 
2. Whether the trial court committed error in awarding 
Russell Nielsen, the non-custodial parent, two children of 
the parties as income tax dependent deductions until such 
time as alimony terminates. 
3. Whether the trial court committed error in not 
awarding Lynette Nielsen all of her attorney fees and costs 
presented at the trial court, Russell Nielsen clearly having 
the greater income and ability to earn income. 
4. Whether Lynette Nielsen is also entitled to an 
award of attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce case. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Lynette Nielsen filed a Complaint for Divorce on 
November 8, 1988. An Order to Show Cause was filed by the 
court on November 18, 1988. Russell Nielsen filed an 
Answer and Counterclaim on or about November 29, 1988. 
On December 12, 1988, a hearing on Lynette Nielsen's 
Order to Show Cause was held before Judge VeNoy 
Christoffersen of the First Judicial District. An Order on 
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Order to Show Cause was signed and entered by Judge 
Christoffersen on December 27, 1988. 
Trial was held on May 12, 1989 and a supplemental 
hearing was held on June 23, 1989 before Judge Gordon J. 
Low. An Order Clarifying Decree was signed and entered 
December 20, 1989. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree 
of Divorce were signed by Judge Gordon J. Low October 6, 
1989, and entered October 11, 1989. 
Another hearing was held November 21, 1989, at the 
request of Russell Nielsen. The hearing on November 21, 
1989 pertained to the valuation and division of personal 
property items only and was not germane to this appeal. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
The Decree of Divorce provided as follows: 
The trial court awarded both parties a divorce. 
Lynette Nielsen was awarded the care, custody and 
control of the parties' four minor children. Russell 
Nielsen was awarded reasonable and liberal visitation with 
the children. Decree of Divorce, numbered paragraph 1. 
Lynette Nielsen was awarded $715.00 per month child 
support from Russell Nielsen. Decree of Divorce, numbered 
paragraph 2. Child support was computed pursuant to Section 
78-45-1 et seq. Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended 1989). 
Findings of Fact, numbered paragraph 7. 
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Russell Nielsen was ordered to maintain the parties' 
children on health, medical and dental insurance, Lynette 
Nielsen ordered to pay the "well care", with remaining 
uninsured expense ordered split equally between the parties. 
Decree of Divorce, numbered paragraph 3. 
Lynette Nielsen was awarded $300.00 per month alimony 
from Russell Nielsen for three years or until Lynette 
Nielsen remarries, cohabits as provided by statute, or 
either party dies, whichever first occurs. Decree of 
Divorce, numbered paragraph 4. 
Until alimony terminates, Russell Nielsen was awarded 
two of the children for tax deduction purposes. Decree of 
Divorce, numbered paragraph 5. 
Lynette Nielsen was awarded the home subject to an 
equal split of equity at least by the time the parties' 
youngest child reaches 18 (approximately eight years). 
Decree of Divorce, numbered paragraph 6. 
The personal property (including retirement) and debts 
were divided one-half to each party. Decree of Divorce, 
numbered paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13. 
Russell Nielsen was ordered to continue his life 
insurance with the children named as sole beneficiaries. 
Decree of Divorce, numbered paragraph 14. 
Lynette Nielsen was awarded $800.00 of her $2,200.00 
attorney fees and costs. Decree of Divorce, numbered 
paragraph 15. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Lynette Nielsen and Russell Nielsen were married 
February 23, 1973. (May 12, 1989 Transcript (hereinafter 
"May Transcript"), page 23, lines 13 and 14.) At the time of 
their marriage, Lynette Nielsen and Russell Nielsen were 18 
years of age. At the time of trial, Lynette Nielsen was 34 
and Russell Nielsen was 35 years of age. (May Transcript, 
page 132, lines 15-19.) 
2. During the course of the marriage, the parties had 
four children. At the time of tr.ial, the children's ages 
were 15, 13, 11 and 10. (May Transcript, page 23, lines 15-
21. ) 
3. Both parties were high school graduates. (May 
Transcript, page 43, lines 7-10.) 
4. Lynette Nielsen's first substantial employment 
during the marriage was in 1987 when she worked as a sales 
clerk at 7-Eleven Sales Corporation, where she earned $4.25 
per hour and earned $5,735.33 in 1987 and approximately 
$4,200.11 in 1988. (May Transcript, page 42, lines 19-25; 
page 43, lines 1-6; page 36, lines 15-16; page 37, lines 7-
10. Plaintiff's Exhibits #2 and #3. June 7, 1989 Jones 
letter to court referenced in Record, page 97.) Lynette 
Nielsen also worked at Hastings Books in 1988 where she 
worked as a sales clerk, earned $4.25 per hour, and 
$2,132.12 during the year. (May Transcript, page 37, lines 
23-25; page 38, line 1. June 7, 1989 Jones letter to court 
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referenced in Record, page 97. June 23, 1989 Transcript 
(hereinafter "June Transcript"), page 17, lines 7-16.) In 
1989, Lynette Nielsen began work at Herff-Jones as a 
production worker at $4.65 per hour. (May Transcript, page 
38, lines 2-14; page 64, line 25; page 65, lines 1-2.) A 
week or two before trial, Lynette Nielsen received a raise 
to $5.00 per hour. (May Transcript, page 63, lines 24-25; 
page 64, lines 22-24.) Lynette Nielsen was laid off the day 
before trial, but remained on-call and expected to go back 
to work in October or November. (May Transcript, page 38, 
lines 15-20; page 79, lines 13-25.) Lynette Nielsen 
testified springtime layoffs were common at Herff-Jones. 
(May Transcript, page 38, lines 21-25; page 39, lines 1-16.) 
At the time of the June hearing (approximately six weeks 
after the May 12 trial), Lynette Nielsen had worked only two 
days at Herff-Jones since the May 12 trial. (June 
Transcript, page 18, lines 1-10.) Lynette Nielsen applied 
for unemployment compensation. (May Transcript, page 39, 
lines 7-21.) The trial court included Lynette Nielsen's 
anticipated unemployment compensation in its finding. (June 
Transcript, page 18, lines 19-25; page 19; page 20, lines 1-
14.) 
5. Lynette Nielsen was trained as a beautician, worked 
at a salon when the parties were first married, but had no 
significant income from this training during th€* marriage or 
at the time of trial. Lynette Nielsen testified that at the 
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time of trial she was only earning $20,00 or so per month 
from haircuts. (May Transcript, page 44, lines 18-20; page 
75, lines 24-25; page 76; page 77, lines 1-5; page 127, 
lines 2-25; page 128, line 1.) 
6. Lynette Nielsen actively sought better employment. 
(May Transcript, page 43, lines 11-21; page 79, lines 24-
25.) 
7. The trial court found Lynette Nielsen's income 
earning ability to be approximately $800.00 per month: 
Plaintiff's historical income for 
calendar years 1987 and 1988 has been 
$500.00 to $600.00 per month. Whereas 
Plaintiff has not worked significantly 
in a full-time situation until calendar 
1989, the Court finds her current income 
making ability to be just under $800.00 
per month. Said $800.00 figure shall be 
used for computation for child support 
purposes. 
Findings of Fact, numbered paragraph 6. In Findings of 
Fact, numbered paragraph 9, the court found: "Plaintiff has 
been a store clerk and a production line worker making 
approximately $4.00 to $5.00 per hour." 
8. Russell Nielsen worked throughout the marriage. 
(May Transcript, page 128, lines 8-14.) Russell Nielsen 
became employed as a journeyman mechanic for Thiokol 
Corporation in November 1983. (May Transcript, page 89, 
lines 23-25; page 89, lines 1-4; page 128, lines 8-10.) 
Russell Nielsen testified that the designation "journeyman 
mechanic" implied significant experience over a significant 
period of time and that he had marketable skills as a semi-
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truck mechanic. (May Transcript, page 156, lines 23-25; 
pages 157-158; page 160, line 25; page 161, lines 1-8.) 
Russell Nielsen testified he earned $14.83 per hour and 
worked substantial overtime in calendar years 1987 and 1988, 
but had no guarantee of as substantial overtime in 1989. 
(May Transcript, page 90, lines 2-19. Defendant's Exhibit 
#3. May Transcript, page 140, lines 7-25; page 141; page 
142, lines 1-4.) Russell Nielsen's 1987 and 1988 income was 
$38,589.14 and $37,940.28 respectively. (May Transcript, 
page 40, lines 8-13. May 30, 1989 Vlahos letter to court 
referenced in Record, page 97. May Transcript, page 142, 
lines 4-21; page 145, lines 4-6.) 
9. The trial court found Russell Nielsen's income 
earning ability to b& $2,750.00 per month: 
Defendant's; historical income over 
calendar y€>ars 1987 and 1988 has 
equalled some $3,000.00 per month. 
Defendant's current income appears to be 
in the $2,500.00 per month range, 
Defendant apparently having no overtime 
available to him at this time. Based 
upon Defendant's historical earnings and 
consideration being given to the 
substantial ability of Defendant to earn 
income, the Court finds Defendant's 
current income making ability to be 
$2,750.00 per month. The child support 
computation should be based on 
Defendant's earning ability of 
$2,750.00. 
Findings of Fact, numbered paragraph 5. In Findings of 
Fact, numbered paragraph 9, the court found: "Defendant is 
a journeyman mechanic and is currently earning nearly $15.00 
per hour." 
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10. The parties cash assets totalled less than 
$4,500.00 and were divided equally between them (less than 
$2,250.00 each). The parties had no other income producing 
property. Findings of Fact numbered paragraphs 7 and 8; 
Order Clarifying Decree numbered paragraph 1(d). 
11. Lynette Nielsen and the children's monthly budget 
was found by the court to be in excess of $2,400.00. 
Findings of Fact, numbered paragraph 5. There was extensive 
testimony about the monthly budget and Lynette Nielsen's and 
the children's standard of living both at the time of trial 
and during the marriage. (May Transcript, pages 33-35. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #1. May Transcript, page 53, lines 16-
20; page 66, lines 17-25; pages 67-68; page 69, lines 1-18; 
page 74, lines 24-25; page 75, lines 1-23; page 80, lines 
12-24; page 101, line 25; pages 102-103; page 104, lines 1-
15; page 121, lines 17-25; pages 122-125; page 126, lines 1-
23; page 137, lines 23-25; page 138, lines 1-11; page 139, 
lines 15-24; page 154, lines 11-16; page 168; page 169, 
lines 1-7. ) 
12. The court made no finding on Russell Nielsen's 
monthly expenses. Russell Nielsen testified he was living 
with his parents and that his budget of $1,296.90 per month 
was an "estimate". (May Transcript, page 132, lines 24-25; 
pages 133-136; page 137, lines 1-22. Defendant's Exhibit 
#4, page 5. ) 
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13. At trial, Lynette Nielsen testified and her 
counsel argued that Lynette Nielsen should receive $500.00 
per month alimony in order that the parties' income and 
standards of living be equalized. (May Transcript, page 57, 
lines 24-5; page 58, lines 1-11; June Transcript, page 33, 
lines 2-25; pages 34-7; page 38, lines 1-3; page 42, lines 
7-12.) At trial, Russell Nielsen testified and his counsel 
argued that Lynette Nielsen should receive no alimony. (May 
Transcript page 138, lines 12-16; June Transcript page 38, 
lines 8-25; pages 39-40; page 41, lines 1-14.) 
14. Lynette Nielsen's reasonable attorney*fees and 
costs were found by the trial court to be $2,200.00. 
Findings of Fact, numbered paragraph 21. (May Transcript, 
page 77, lines 24-5; page 78, lines 1-4; page 170, lines 25; 
pages 171-72; page 173, lines 1-4; June Transcript, page 62, 
lines 25; page 63; page 64, lines 1-5.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Lynette Nielsen should receive substantial long-
term alimony. The trial court's award of $300.00 per month 
alimony for three years should be reversed. During the 
parties' marriage, Lynette Nielsen cared for the children 
and maintained the home, Russell Nielsen worked. Lynette 
Nielsen's work experience is limited and at the time of 
trial she was unemployed, was on-call at her employment as a 
production worker for which she was paid $5.00 per hour when 
on the job. Russell Nielsen was a journeyman mechanic, was 
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also qualified to work as a semi-truck mechanic, earned 
$14.53 per hour through his employment at Thiokol 
Corporation and in calendar years 1987 and 1988 worked 
substantial overtime. 
The parties were married for 16-plus years, having been 
married just out of high school. The parties' four 
children, ranging in age from 15 to 10, were placed in the 
custody of Lynette Nielsen. 
Lynette Nielsen is entitled to alimony at the $500.00 
level requested at court, said alimony to continue until 
terminated as provided by law. 
2. Lynette Nielsen should be entitled to claim all of 
the parties' children for tax deduction purposes where she 
is the custodial parent. The trial court's award of two of 
the deductions to Russell Nielsen should be reversed on 
grounds where the court did not make a finding with respect 
to the maximizing of the financial resources available to 
the family, the court did not order the award to be 
contingent on Russell Nielsen remaining current in his 
payment of child support, and the award has the effect of 
diluting the value of the alimony award made to Lynette 
Nielsen. 
3. Lynette Nielsen should be awarded her attorney fees 
and costs incurred at the trial level, subsequent to trial, 
and on appeal. Lynette Nielsen's attorney fees and costs at 
trial were $2,200.00 and were found to be reasonable by the 
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court. The trial court's award of only $800.00 of those 
attorney fees should be reversed on grounds that Lynette 
Nielsen's ability to earn was much less than the ability of 
Russell Nielsen to earn income, there were no other 
financial resources from which Lynette Nielsen may pay her 
fees, and Lynette Nielsen had a significant financial need. 
Lynette Nielsen should be awarded her reasonable attorney 
fees and costs at trial, subsequent to trial, and on this 
appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
LYNETTE NIELSEN IS ENTITLED TO 
SUBSTANTIAL, LONG-TERM ALIMONY AND THE 
TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO SO PROVIDE. 
The alimony issue is at the heart of Lynette Nielsen's 
appeal. 
This case involved a 16-plus-year marriage during which 
four children were born. The children, now in the custody 
of their mother, Lynette Nielsen, ranged in age from 15 to 
10 at the time of trial. 
During the parties' marriage, Russell Nielsen provided 
the income while Lynette Nielsen raised the children and 
kept the home. 
Russell Nielsen, a journeyman mechanic, earned 
approximately $38,000.00 per year in calendar years 1987 and 
1988. Russell Nielsen was paid a wage of $14.53 per hour 
and worked substantial overtime. Citing the apparent 
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unavailability of overtime, the court found Russell 
Nielsen's income at the time of trial to be $2,500.00 per 
month, but after taking into consideration Russell 
Nielsen's earning ability and historical income, the court 
imputed $2,750.00 per month income to Russell Nielsen. 
Lynette Nielsen's first substantial part-time 
employment during the marriage was in calendar years 1987 
and 1988. In 1987, Lynette Nielsen worked as a clerk for 
7-11 and earned $4.25 per hour. Lynette Nielsen's total 
earnings for 1987 were less than $6,000.00. In 1988, 
Lynette Nielsen continued to work at 7-11, eventually 
changing jobs to work for Hastings Books where she also 
earned approximately $4.25 per hour. Lynette Nielsen's 1988 
income was approximately $6,400.00. At the time of trial, 
Lynette Nielsen was working at Herff-Jones as a seasonal 
production worker. Two weeks before trial, Lynette Nielsen 
received a raise, bringing her hourly income to $5.00 per 
hour. Due to the seasonal nature of her employment, on the 
day of trial, Lynette Nielsen was unemployed. Between May 
12, 1989 and June 23, 1989, Lynette Nielsen worked only two 
days. Lynette Nielsen hoped to obtain unemployment 
compensation. The court added anticipated unemployment 
compensation to Lynette Nielsen's projected earnings for 
1989 and imputed income to Lynette Nielsen of just under 
$800.00 per month. 
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Lynette Nielsen was a licensed beautician, but her only 
out of home experience was during the first year or two of 
the marriage and income at the time of trial from cutting 
hair was approximately $20.00 per month. 
Lynette Nielsen testified that she had searched for 
meaningful employment and that the Herff-Jones job was the 
best employment she was able to find. 
The court evenly divided the parties1 assets and debts. 
The cash assets divided between the parties were less than 
$4,500.00, $2,250.00 per person. Neither party had other 
income producing assets. 
The trial court found Lynette Nielsen and the 
children's monthly budget to be in excess of $2,400.00. The 
i 
court made no finding with respect to Russell Nielsen's 
monthly budget. 
The trial record readily shows the disparity in income 
and earning potential of the parties. The trial court found 
Lynette Nielsen's monthly earning ability to be less than 
$800.00 per month. The trial court found Russell Nielsen's 
monthly earning ability to be $2,750.00, nearly three and a 
half times that of Lynette Nielsen. Lynette Nielsen does 
not dispute the court's findings with respect to the 
parties' income earning ability. 
The court found Lynette Nielsen's and the children's 
monthly budget to be in excess of $2,400.00. Lynette 
Nielsen does not dispute that finding. Adding $715.00 to 
-14-
Lynette Nielsen's imputed income of $800.00 per month 
(noting the $800.00 is gross income), Lynette Nielsen has 
$1,515.00 under the court's order to meet $2,400.00 in 
expenses for herself and the children. 
As stated by the Utah Supreme Court on numerous 
occasions: 
An alimony award should, as far as 
possible, equalize the parties' 
respective standards of living and 
maintain them at a level as close as 
possible to the standard of living 
enjoyed during the marriage. In 
determining the amount of alimony to be 
awarded, it was necessary for the trial 
court to consider the financial 
condition and needs of the Plaintiff, 
her ability to produce a sufficient 
income for herself, and the ability of 
the Defendant to provide support. 
Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985) (footnotes 
omitted. See also English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 
1977) and Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379 (Utah 1983). 
To date, Lynette Nielsen has held only part-time 
minimal wage jobs. The economic reality is that Lynette 
Nielsen may never be able to earn as much as Russell 
Nielsen. As stated by Justice Durham in Higley, supra: 
In 1981, the median income for a woman 
in the United States with a high school 
education was $6,495 per year. See 
Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Current Population Reports, 
Series P-670 No. 137, Money Income of 
Households, Families, and Persons in the 
United States: 1981, Table 37 
(Washington, D.C., 1983). Another study 
reveals that, overall, women's earnings 
in the United States average $.59 for 
every $1 earned by men. See, Bureau of 
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Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of 
Labor, Report 673, The Female—Male 
Earnings Gap: A review of Employment 
and Earnings Issues, Table 6 
(Washington, D.C., September, 1982). 
676 P.2d at 831. Lynette Nielsen's income for calendar 
years 1987 and 1988 was very close to the 1981 median U.S. 
income for a woman with a high school education. Lynette 
Nielsen testified she looked for better employment but that 
the seasonal employment at Herff-Jones at $5.00 per hour 
was the best employment she could find. 
During the course of the parties' marriage, Russell 
Nielsen worked while Lynette Nielsen cared for the children 
and maintained the home. As testified by Russell Nielsen, 
his journeyman's mechanic status is a result of significant 
experience in his area of employment. While Lynette Nielsen 
was at home caring for the children and maintaining the 
home, Russell Nielsen was able to gain work experience and 
thereby enhance his income earning ability. 
Lynette Nielsen's request for $500.00 per month alimony 
was reasonable in light of all of the circumstances of this 
case. Though concededly not controlling on the trial court, 
the Order on Order to Show Cause signed by Judge 
Christoffersen provided for $500.00 per month temporary 
alimony. Lynette Nielsen testified the $500.00 per month 
temporary alimony received by her for approximately six 
months before the trial kept her reasonably close to the 
standard of living enjoyed by her during the marriage. 
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The trial court's award of alimony was much less than 
the $500.00 requested by Lynette Nielsen. When the award of 
two of the children for tax deduction purposes, and the 
award of $800.00 of $2,200.00 attorney fees and costs are 
factored in, the trial court's award of alimony is even 
less. The trial court's award of $300.00 was contrary to 
case law, is a substantial and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion, and should be increased to $500.00 per month as 
requested by Lynette Nielsen. 
The trial court was also in error in limiting the 
alimony to three years. Lynette Nielsen's and Russell 
Nielsen's marriage was a long term marriage. Lynette 
Nielsen was entitled to long-term alimony. 
Though not identical in all respects, this case shares 
many similarities with the facts in Olson, supra. Similar 
to Mrs. Olson in Olson, supra, Lynette Nielsen married at 
18, worked for a time (Lynette Nielsen as a beautician, 
Mrs. Olson as a typist) quit work to raise children, 
(Lynette Nielsen has four children, Mrs. Olson, six) was not 
employed outside the home during the marriage until two 
years before the divorce (Mrs. Olson was not employed until 
her separation), was employed at minimal wage jobs, was 
custodial parent of four minor children (Mrs. Olson had 
three at home), and was married 16-plus years (Mrs. Olson 
was married 22 1/2 years and was separated the last two of 
those years). In both cases, the husbands worked during the 
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marriage and received substantial earned income at the time 
of the divorce (Mr, Olson more than Russell Nielsen), and 
there were minimal cash assets and income producing 
property. Lynette Nielsen's and the children's monthly 
budget was $2,400.00 (Mrs. Olson's and the children's 
monthly budget was $4,200.00). Lynette Nielsen was awarded 
$300.00 per month alimony for three years (Mrs. Olson was 
awarded alimony at $1,600.00 per month for two years). 
Reversing the trial court's limitation of alimony to 
two years, and exercising its discretion power to make the 
alimony permanent, the Utah Supreme Court held: 
We agree, however, with the plaintiff's 
contention that the court's order that 
alimony terminate after two years was a 
clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion. As we stated in Jones v. 
Jones, "[t]his is simply not the sort of 
situation in which a decreasing 
rehabilitative alimony award is 
appropriate." Married soon after 
graduating from high school, the 
plaintiff's primary occupation during 
the twenty-odd year marriage, was caring 
for the parties' home and six children. 
Having worked only minor clerical jobs 
for two brief periods over twenty years 
apart, she has no reasonable expectation 
of obtaining employment two years hence 
that will enable her to support herself 
at a standard of living even approaching 
that which she had during the marriage. 
Continuing spousal maintenance is 
mandated by these circumstances. 
Therefore, under our discretionary power 
to modify the final decree in a divorce 
action, we hereby modify the decree of 
divorce in this case to provide for 
permanent alimony from defendant to 
plaintiff. Again, should the 
circumstances change in the future, the 
defendant may petition the court to 
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modify the decree under its continuing 
jurisdiction, 
704 P.2d at 567 (footnotes omitted). (The citation on Jones 
v. Jones is 700 P.2d 1072 at 1076 (Utah 1985). 
The trial court's limitation of alimony to three years 
under the circumstances of this case was contrary to case 
law, and was a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. 
The alimony should be increased and be made permanent, to 
terminate only as provided by law. 
II 
LYNETTE NIELSEN IS ENTITLED TO ALL OF 
THE CHILDREN FOR TAX DEDUCTION PURPOSES. 
The trial court awarded Russell Nielsen two of the 
children for tax deduction purposes during the time alimony 
was paid. 
At the time of trial, Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) and Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 
(Utah Ct. App.) cert, granted, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988) 
were the controlling cases. After the trial of this case, 
Fullmer and Martinez, supra, were distinguished in the case 
of Motes v. Motes, 112 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). • In Motes, supra, the Court wrote that Fullmer and 
Martinez, supra, "dealt generally with the question of 
dependent tax exemption in the divorce context. However, 
neither involved an actual order that the forms be 
executed." 121 Utah Adv. Rep. at 52. 
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Under Motes, supra, the trial courtf s authority to 
award a dependency deduction is limited. This court held 
that "the power to order execution of section 152 
declaration should be cautiously and prudently used, with 
the sole objective of maximizing the financial resources 
available to the family unit". 121 Utah Adv. Rep. at 55. 
This court also required that a trial court's order make the 
signing of a yearly declaration "contingent on the 
noncustodial parent being current in support payments." 
Ibid. 
The findings in this case do not show whether the trial 
court was maximizing the financial resources of the family 
unit in requiring Lynette Nielsen to sign a dependent 
declaration to Russell Nielsen. The child support award, 
figured according to the statute, was not refigured. 
Alimony was essentially diluted. 
The order did not condition Lynette Nielsen's signing 
of the declaration of Russell Nielsen being current in his 
support. 
The trial court's failure to make a finding as to how 
the dependent deduction award would enhance the family 
income and failure to condition the award on Russell Nielsen 
being current in his child support, is contrary to case law, 
is a clear and substantial abuse of discretion, and is 
reversible error. 
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Ill 
LYNETTE NIELSEN IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD 
OF HER ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS REASONABLY 
INCURRED IN THIS MATTER AT TRIAL AND ON 
THIS APPEAL. 
The trial court found that Lynette Nielsen reasonably 
incurred $2,200.00 in attorney fees and costs. The trial 
court awarded Lynette Nielsen $800.00 of those fees and 
costs and stayed execution upon Russell Nielsen's payment of 
$50.00 per month. 
Lynette Nielsen testified that she had no means with 
which to pay her fees and costs in this case. As already 
argued, Russell Nielsen's income and income earning ability 
far exceeded that of Lynette Nielsen. The trial court 
recognized the award of attorney fees was in Russell 
Nielsen's favor. "I am, however, cognizant that given the 
entire picture, the income and needs of the two parties will 
probably balance eventually out in favor of the Defendant 
(Russell Nielsen)." June Transcript, page 63, lines 13-
16. 
Section 30-3-3 Utah Code Ann. (1984) provides that a 
trial court may award attorney fees and costs in a divorce 
actipn. In order to recover on her attorney fees and costs, 
Lynette Nielsen was required at trial to show that the fees 
and costs requested were reasonable and that Lynette Nielsen 
was financially unable to pay the fees and costs. Huck v. 
Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1986). 
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In this case the reasonableness of Lynette Nielsen's 
attorney fees and costs were presented by Lynette Nielsen's 
counsel by proffer by stipulation of Russell Nielsen's 
counsel. The fees and costs were not refuted by Russell 
Nielsen. The trial court found the sum of $2,200.00 was a 
reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
Lynette Nielsen's income was imputed at $800.00 per 
month. Lynette Nielsen was an unemployed minimal wage 
production worker. Russell Nielsen's income was $2,750.00 
per month. Russell Nielsen was fully employed. Lynette 
Nielsen testified she had no financial ability to pay her 
fees. 
In Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476 (Utah App. 
1988), this Court ruled that where the plaintiff was earning 
$200.00 per month and the defendant $1,405.00 per month and 
the plaintiff had no means to pay her fees, the trial court 
abused its discretion in failing to award the plaintiff her 
attorney fees and awarded her attorney fees and costs both 
for trial and on appeal. 
Lynette Nielsen, having met her burden on both 
reasonableness of the fees and costs incurred, her need, and 
Russell Nielsen's far greater ability to pay the fees and 
costs, should have been awarded all of her reasonable 
attorney fees and costs in this matter. The trial court's 
failure to award her fees was an abuse of discretion and 
should be reversed. 
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Lynette Nielsen respectfully submits that where she had 
a continuing need and Russell Nielsen's income and earning 
ability far exceed her own, she should also be awarded a 
reasonable attorney fee and costs incurred subsequent to 
trial and in the bringing of this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Lynette Nielsen respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the trial court and award her substantial permanent 
alimony as requested at the trial level, reverse the trial 
court and reinstate all of the dependent tax deductions to 
her, and reverse the trial court and award the entire 
$2,200.00 attorney fees and costs incurred by her at trial, 
as well as a reasonable attorney fee and costs incurred 
subsequent to trial and in the bringing of this appeal. 
Dated this day of February, 1990. 
ULLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
V 
LAftRY E. JONES" 
Attorney f^ r Plaintiff/Appellant 
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I hereby certify that/ar true and correct e<spy of the 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LYNETTE D. NIELSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RUSSELL CLYDE NIELSEN, 
Defendant* 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 880027020 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
on May 12, 1989. Plaintiff appeared in person and by and 
through her attorney, Larry E. Jones of Hillyard, Anderson & 
Olsen. Defendant appeared in person and by and through his 
attorney, Pete N. Vlahos. Witnesses were heard, exhibits 
presented, and arguments made. A supplemental hearing was 
held on June 23, 1989, at the request of the Court. Further 
arguments from counsel were made. Based on the evidence 
before the Court, and good cause appearing, the Court makes 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant were married February 23, 
1973. Plaintiff and Defendant are residents of Cache 
County, State of Utah, and were residents for more than 
three months prior to the filing of the complaint and 
counterclaim in this matter. 
2. There exists irreconcilable differences between the 
parties • Plaintiff having filed a complaint^9^1^^110311* 
OCT 111989 
having filed a counterclaim, ea^h party should be awarded a 
decree of divorce from the other • It further appearing to 
the Court that there is no chance of a reconciliation at 
this time, the decree if divorce should be final upon 
signing and entry by the Court,. 
3* Plaintiff and Defendant are the parents of four (4) 
2 children, namely: DENISE, born September 11, 1973; SHERI, 
X 
S born June 13, 1976; ANDREW, born May 3, 1978; and CHAD, born 
z 
g October 17, 1979-
-i 
£ 4. The Court interviewed the parties' daughter, Sheri, 
o 
H at the request of the Defendant* Based upon the evidence 
V) 
t before the Court and based upon the Court's discussion with 
< 
« Sheri in chambers, the Court finds that it is in the best 
5 interests and welfare of the children that their care, 
•i 
-i 
o 
* custody and control be awarded to the Plaintiff* Defendant 
z 
g should be awarded reasonable and liberal visitation with the 
14 
Q 
< children upon reasonable notice to Plaintiff* 
Q 
£ 5* As to child support, the monthly expenses of 
a 
Id 
O 
£ 
k. 
O 
Plaintiff and the minor children of the parties are over 
$2,400*00 per month, evidencing a significant need of 
< support* Defendant's historical income over calendar years 
1987 and 1988 has equalled some $3,000*00 per month* 
Defendant's current Income appears to be in the $2,500*00 
per month range. Defendant apparently having no overtime 
available to him at this time* Based upon Defendant's 
historical earnings and consideration being given to the 
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X 
< 
substantial ability of Defendant to earn income, the Court 
finds Defendant's current income making ability to be 
$2,750*00 per month. The child support computation should 
be based on Defendant's earning ability of $2,750.00• 
6* Plaintiff's historical income for calendar years 
1987 and 1988 has been $500.00 to $600.00 per month. 
Plaintiff's current Income is just under $800.00 per month. 
Whereas Plaintiff has not worked significantly in a full-
z 
g time situation until calendar 1989, the Court finds her 
H current Income making ability to be just under $800.00 per 
o 
i- month. Said $800.00 figure shall be used for computation 
t for child support purposes. 
< 
» 7. The Court having requested counsel to compute the 
2 child support obligation on the Child Support Guideline 
o 
« Worksheet and also on the guidelines to go into effect on 
z 
g July 1, 1989, consideration to be given to Defendant for 
M Q 
< some $30.00 per month which he indicated is his cost for the 
Q 
J children's insurance, the Court was presented figures of 
* between $714.00 and $789.00 per month child support. The 
€1 
Id 
c Court finds that $715.00 is a reasonable sum for child 
o 
I support in this case. Child support should be paid one-half 
on or before the 5th day and one-half on or before the 20th 
day of each and every month through the Clerk of the above-
captioned Court. 
8. Defendant has available to him health, medical and 
dental insurance through his employment at Morton Thiokol, 
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Inc. The Defendant should be required to maintain the 
children on his health, medical and dental insurance. 
Plaintiff and Defendant should each be required to split any 
uninsured health, medical and dental expense. Reasonable 
health, medical and dental expense should include reasonable 
orthodontic and eye care. In the event an orthodontic bill 
.» 
S is to be -incurred, the party proposing that the bill be 
z 
5 Incurred should be required to petition the Court for 
z 
S decision as to the reasonableness of the bill. Further, 
?£ Plaintiff should be responsible for well care for the 
o 
H children. Well care shall be that medical care which is not 
t anticipated by insurance and is not covered by insurance. 
» For instance, if the child goes to the doctor with a cold, 
3 ordinarily part of that bill is covered by insurance, any 
-J 
o 
« uninsured amount to be split by the parties. If the child 
z 
o 
g obtains a physical for school purposes or for camp, that is 
u 
Q 
< well care and is not normally covered by Insurance and would 
6 
JS b  the spons bili y f P aintiff. 
* 9. The parties have been married for some 16 years. 
o 
£ Defendant's earning ability exceeds Plaintiff's by 
o 
I approximately three times. Plaintiff has been a store clerk 
and a production line worker making approximately $4.00 to 
$5.00 per hour. Defendant is a journeyman mechanic and is 
currently earning nearly $15.00 per hour. Given the length 
of the marriage, differential of Income and Income earning 
ability, and the differential in historical earnings, the 
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Court finds it reasonable «to award Plaintiff alimony from 
the Defendant in the sum of $300.00 per month for a period 
of three years or until such time as Plaintiff remarries, 
cohabits as provided by statute, or either party dies, 
whichever first occurs. Said alimony should be paid one-
half on or before the 5th day and one-half on or before the 
20th day of each and every month through ^ bhe Clerk of the 
above-captioned Court. 
10. Until such time as alimony terminates, the parties 
shall split the Income tax dependent deduction of the minor 
children of the parties, each party to take two children for 
tax purposes. Upon termination of alimony, all tax 
deductions should go to Plaintiff. 
11. As to the home of the parties, the Court finds 
that the home has a value of $76,000.00. The Court further 
finds that the current payout on the home is $25,902.59, for 
a total equity of $50,097.41. The Court awards each party 
one-half of the equity in the home. No interest will accrue 
on Defendant's share. Rather, Defendant should receive his 
one-half share of equity upon the first of the following 
events: Plaintifffs remarriage or cohabitation as provided 
under the alimony statute; the youngest of the parties' 
children reaching the age of majority; or upon sale of the 
home by Plaintiff. The Court reserves jurisdiction with 
respect to the home and its sale and division of equity. 
Plaintiff should be responsible for the mou^tgage, taxes 
and insurance on the home* Defendant should immediately 
quit-claim any and all interest which he may have in the 
home to Plaintiff subject to the lien interest as provided 
above* 
12. Plaintiff should be awarded the following personal 
5 property: Household furniture and appliances, including the 
O 
X 
5 stereo, which the Court places at a value of $3,500*00; one-
| half of the First Security Bank CD and First Security Bank 
o 
JL 
x savings account, which one-half is $1,231*05 and $513*26 
o 
z
 respectively; the 1974 GMC Jimmy which the Court values at 
40 
c 
c
 $750.00; lawn mower and yard equipment which the Court 
•j values at $100*00; 1954-56 Chevrolet truck; Stihl 16" chain 
g saw; as well as all other property presently in her 
m 
JL 
° possession except as specifically awarded to Defendant 
z 
2 below* 
m 
Q 
* 13. D fendant should be awarded the f llowi g personal 
< property: His checking account; one-half of the First 
* Security Bank CD and First Security Bank savings account in 
u 
^ the amounts of $1,231*05 and $513*27 respectively; 1969 
o 
I Chevrolet truck which is valued at $500*00; 1981 Terry 
travel trailer which is valued at $4,000*00; guns and gun 
cabinet which are valued at $1,700*00 for purposes of this 
distribution; the tools which he now has in his possession 
which the Court values at $500*00; 1976 Chevrolet Impala and 
old car parts; and choice of one of the freezers* 
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€4 
< 
m 
-i 
o 
*14. Inasmuch as Plaintifffs personal property award 
totals $4,350.00 and Defendant's personal property award 
totals $6,700.00, the Plaintiff should be awarded one-half 
the difference of $2,350.00 or $1,175.00 as a Judgment 
against Defendant. 
15. Plaintiff should be awarded a one-half Interest in 
Defendant's employee savings Investment program obtained by 
X 
£ Defendant through his employment at Morton Thlokol, Inc. 
z 
§ The Court finds the value of said ESIP entitlement to be 
£ $15,794.44, one-half of which should be awarded to 
o 
* Plaintiff, said one-half being $7,897.22. As of May 12, 
1989, said sum should be distributed to Plaintiff, along 
with any Interest accrued thereon from March 30, 1989 to the 
date of withdrawal, immediately upon request by Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff should pay any penalties or taxes incurred as a 
z 
S result of her obtaining her one-half interest in said ESIP 
Id 
Q 
< interest. 
6 
c 
£ 16. Plaintiff should be awarded a one-half interest in 
* any and all retirement which Defendant has acquired at his 
w 
u 
t employment at Thlokol, it appearing that Defendant's 
o 
I employment at Thlokol has been during the marriage of the 
parties. Said one-half interest shall be computed from the 
Defendant began his employment at Thlokol until the date of 
the hearing of the divorce in this matter, being May 12, 
1989. 
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z 
** 
u 
ta. 
o 
17. Plaintiff should be responsible for the following 
debts and obligations: J.C. Penney bill in the approximate 
sum of $75*00; Logan City obligation in the approximate sum 
of $700.00; personal loan to her father in the approximate 
sum of $500.00. Plaintiff should be required to indemnify 
and hold Defendant harmless therefrom. 
18. Defendant should be responsible for the following 
debts and obligations: J. Thomas Smith, D.D.S. bill In the 
g approximate sum of $200.00; First Security Bank credit card 
JE in the approximate sum of $250.00; loan from Carol A. 
o 
t- Nielsen, Defendant's mother. In the approximate sum of 
•i 
c 
Su 
m 
< 
$1,250.00; and the 1987 tax obligation. Defendant should be 
required to indemnify and hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
2 19. The parties represented to the Court that the 
•i o 
« foregoing debts and obligations are all of the debts and 
z 
g obligations of the parties excepting the mortgage on the 
M Q 
< home which Is provided for above. 
d 
c 
J 20. Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, Defendant 
X 
should continue his current life Insurance through his 
employment at Morton Thlokol, Inc. In the base amount of 
| approximately $60,000.00 with the children of the parties 
named as sole beneficiaries thereon. Said insurance shall 
continue with the children named as sole beneficiaries until 
the youngest child of the parties reaches the age of 
majority. 
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X 
< 
21* As to Plaintiff's claim for attorney fees. 
Plaintiff presented attorney fees and costs in the sura of 
$2,200*00* The Court finds said fees and costs to be 
reasonable in light of the difficulty of the divorce and the 
time spent in the case* The Court further finds the hourljf 
charge of $85*00 per hour to be a reasonable charge and a 
rate commonly charged in the community* Given the 
disparity in Income of the parties, relative availability of 
z 
g funds for Plaintiff to pay her own attorney fees, the 
J. alimony obligation of Defendant to Plaintiff, the Court 
o 
H awards to Plaintiff the sum of $800*00 attorney fees and 
tZ 
costs to be paid by Defendant to Plaintiff. An order should 
« be entered staying execution upon the $800*00 attorney fees 
S so long as Defendant pays the sum of $50*00 per month toward 
-j 
o 
« said fees* 
2 
• 22* The terms and conditions of this decree should 
M 
Q 
< take effect as of the date of trial in this matter, being 
Q 
t May 12, 1989. 
* The Court having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, 
S 
c makes the following: 
o 
| CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1* That Plaintiff and Defendant each be awarded a 
decree of divorce one from the other, said decree to become 
final upon signing and entry by the Court* 
2. A decree of divorce should be entered in accordance 
with the Findings of Fact as stared herein* 
-9-
Dated this (p day of ()(*T , 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
-District Juttge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to Defendant's attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, 
at 2447 Klesel Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401, this •<!/ day of 
October, 1989. 
'&*<>*&, /M^J>7 
Secretary 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LYNETTE D. NIELSEN, 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. 
RUSSELL CLYDE NIELSEN, ] 
Defendant* ] 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
) Civil No. 880027020 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
on May 12, 1989. Plaintiff appeared in person and by and 
through her attorney, Larry E. Jones of Hillyard, Anderson G 
Olsen. Defendant appeared in person and by and through his 
attorney, Pete N. Vlahos. Witnesses were heard, exhibits 
presented, and arguments made. A supplemental hearing was 
held on June 23, 1989, at the request of the Court* Further 
arguments from counsel were made. Based on the evidence 
before the Court, having heretofore entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and control 
of the minor children of the parties* Defendant is awarded 
reasonable and liberal visitation with the children upon 
reasonable notice to Plaintiff. 
2. Commencing May 12, 1989, Defendant shall pay to 
Plaintiff the sum of $715.00 per month child gyfiffig^ * Said 
MICRO FILMED FILED 
OATE: //f- /&&f .
 0 C T 11 #89 
child support shall be paid one-half on or before the 5th 
day and one-half on or before the 20th day of each and every 
month through the Clerk of the above-captloned Court. 
II 3 Defendant shall maintain the children on his health, 
medical and dental insurance* Plaintiff and Defendant shall 
split any uninsured health, medical and dental expense* 
2 Reasonable health, medical and dental expense shall Include 
5 reasonable orthodontic and eye care. In the event an 
i 
§ orthodontic bill is to be incurred, the party proposing that 
£ the bill be incurred is required to petition the Court for 
O 
H decision as to the reasonableness of the bill. Further, 
£ 
£ Plaintiff is responsible for well care for the children. 
< 
« Well care is. that medical care which is not anticipated by 
2 insurance and is not covered by insurance. For instance, if 
« 
o 
« the child goes to the doctor with a cold, ordinarily a part 
T 
g of that bill is covered by insurance, any uninsured amount 
M 
Q 
< to be split by the parties. If the child obtains a physical 
6 
f. for school purposes or for camp, that is well care and is 
* not normally covered by insurance and would be the 
u £ responsibility of Plaintiff. 
o 
| 4. As of May 12, 1989, Defendant shall pay to 
II Plaintiff the sum of $300.00 per month alimony for a period 
of three years or until such time as Plaintiff remarries, 
cohabits as provided by statute# or either party dies, 
whichever first occurs. Said alimony shall be paid one-half 
on or before the 5th day and one-half on or before the 20th 
-2-
day of each and every month through the Clerk of the above-
cap tioned Court. 
5. Until such time as alimony terminates, the parties 
shall split the income tax dependent deductions of the minor 
children of the parties, each party to take two children for 
tax purposes. Upon termination of alimony, all tax 
5 deductions shall go to Plaintiff* 
m 
| 6. As to the equity in the home, the present equity in 
< the home is $50,097.41. Defendant shall receive his one-
o 
3 
x half share of equity, without interest, on the first of the 
§ following events: Plaintifffs remarriage or cohabitation as 
I provided under the alimony statute; the youngest of the 
« parties1 children reaching the age of majority; or upon sale 
n 
£ of the home by Plaintiff. The Court reserves jurisdiction 
o with respect to the home and its sale and division of 
| equity. 
§ Plaintiff is responsible for the mortgage, taxes and 
< 
Q * insurance on the home. Defendant shall immediately quit-
claim any and all interest which he may have in the home to 
Plaintiff subject to the lien interest as provided above. 
^ 7. Plaintiff is awarded the following personal 
property: Household furniture and appliances, including the 
stereo; one-half of the First Security Bank CD and First 
Security Bank savings account, which one-half is $1,231.05 
and $513.26 respectively; 1974 GMC Jimmy; lawn mower and 
yard equipment; 1954-56 Chevrolet truck; Stihl 16" chain 
-3-
saw; as well as all other personal property presently in her 
possession except as specifically awarded to Defendant 
below. 
8. Defendant is awarded the following personal 
property: His checking account; one-half of the First 
Security Bank CD and First Security Bank savings account in 
the amounts of $1,231.05 and $513.27 respectively; 1969 
Chevrolet truck; 1981 Terry Travel Trailer; guns and gun 
z 
g cabinet; the tools which he now has in his possession; 1976 
•i 
JE Chevrolet Impala and old car parts; and choice of one of the 
o 
t- freezers. 
m 
c 
£ 9. Plaintiff is awarded a one-half interest in 
< 
« Defendants employee savings investment program obtained by 
X 
< 
w Defendant through his employment at Morton Thiokol, Inc. 
The value of said ESIP entitlement is $15,794.44, one-half 
of which is awarded to Plaintiff, said one-half being 
z 
o 
« 
AC 
w 
o 
< $7,897.22. As of May 12, 1989, said sura shall be 
d 
t distributed to Plaintiff, along with any interest accrued 
thereon from March 30, 1989 to the date of withdrawal. 
t immediately upon request by Plaintiff. Plaintiff shall pay 
o 
< any penalties or taxes Incurred as a result of her 
obtaining her one-half interest in said ESIP interest. 
10. Plaintiff is awarded Judgment against the 
Defendant in the sum of $1,175.00 representing the 
difference in the personal property awards. 
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11. Plaintiff is awarded a one-half interest in any 
and all retirement which Defendant has acquired at his 
employment at Thiokol, it appearing that Defendant's 
employment at Thiokol has been during the marriage of the 
parties. Said one-half interest is computed from the time 
Defendant began his employment at Thiokol until the date of 
the hearing of the divorce in this matter, being May 12, 
1989. 
12. Plaintiff shall be responsible for the following 
debts and obligations: J.C. Penney bill; Logan City 
obligation; and personal loan to her father. Plaintiff is 
required to Indemnify and hold Defendant harmless 
therefrom. 
13. Defendant shall be responsible for the following 
debts and obligations: J. Thomas Smith, D.D.S. bill; First 
Security Bank credit card; loan from Carol A. Nielsen, 
Defendants mother; and the 1987 tax obligation. Defendant 
is required to indemnify and hold Plaintiff harmless 
therefrom. 
14. Defendant shall continue his current life 
insurance through his employment at Morton Thiokol, Inc. in 
the base amount of approximately $60,000.00 with the 
children of the parties named as sole beneficiaries thereon. 
Said insurance shall continue with the children named as 
sole beneficiaries until the youngest child of the parties 
reaches the age of majority• 
-5-
15. Plaintiff is awarded $800.00 attorney fees and 
costs to be paid by Defendant to Plaintiff. There will be a 
stay upon the $800.00 attorney fees and costs to be paid by 
Defendant so long as Defendant pays the sum of $50.00 per 
month towards said fees. 
16. This decree shall take effect as of the date of 
S trial in this matter, being May 12, 1989. 
S Dated this (^> day of OdT&fxA . 1989. 
g BY THE COURT 
i 
g ^District (fudge 
i. MAILING CERTIFICATE 
2 I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true 
o 
4s and correct copy of the foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE to 
g Defendant's attorney, Pete N„ Vlahos, at 2447 Kiesel Avenue, 
< Ogden, Utah 84401, this A/ day of October, 1989. 
c 
cretarv ^ 
a 
% I. CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING 
| IS A TRUE AND CORPECT COPY 
J
 OF THE ORIGINAL F5L3? !« ^RST 
DISTRICT COURT, C 
S e c e t a r y ^ 
\,» ;•.?;-.-.. 
- 6 -
XjO.-LI._Y J-J . U U 1 1 C O IT-L. / -z ^ 
HIL-./ARD, ANDERSON Si OLSEN 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W 
175 EAST F IRST NORTH 
L O G A N , U T A H 8 4 3 2 1 
TELEPHONE(801) 7 5 2 - 2 6 1 0 
LOGAN DISTRICT 
DEC 18 4 5 5 PM'89 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LYNETTE D. NIELSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RUSSELL CLYDE NIELSEN, 
Defendant. 
ORDER CLARIFYING DECREE 
Civil No. 880027020 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
on Defendant's Objection to Findings of Fact cind Conclusions 
of Law and Decree of Divorce on November 21, 1989, The 
Honorable Gordon J. Low presided. Plaintiff appeared in 
person and by and through her attorney, Larry E. Jones of 
Hillyard, Anderson & Olsen. Defendant appeared in person 
and by and through his attorney, Pete N. Vlahos. Proffers 
were made by counsel and arguments heard from counsel. 
Based upon the proffer and arguments, and good cause 
appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The decree of divorce signed by the Court on 
October 6, 1989, and entered by the Court on October 11, 
1989, is hereby clarified and amended as follows: 
(a) As to paragraph 12 of the findings of fact 
and paragraph 7 of the decree of divorce, Plaintiff is 
awarded the Stihl 16-inch chainsaw and a judgment against 
NUMBER. 
FILED MICRO FILMED 
DATE: X O - J3_ £? 
Defendant for $150.00, said judgment to be satisfied either 
by payment of the $150.00 or delivery of the Stihl 16-inch 
chainsaw by Defendant to Plaintiff. 
(b) As to paragraph 13 of the findings of fact, 
the guns and gun cabinet are valued at $1,250.00 for 
purposes of the distribution. 
(c) As to paragraph 14 of the findings of fact 
and paragraph 10 of the decree of divorce the personal 
property award to Defendant is $6,250.00 and the difference 
•E in the two awards is $1,900.00, resulting in a $950.00 
o 
* judgment to Defendant instead of the $1,175.00 judgment 
w 
£ provided in the decree. 
< 
u, (d) As an additional finding to the findings of 
§ fact and additional order to the decree of divorce, the 
«, parties' interest in the Metropolitan whole life policy is 
hereby divided one-half to each, the value of the policy to 
2 
O 
<n 
u 
Q 
< be determined as of May 12, 1989, and judgment is awarded to 
Q 
-J 
Plaintiff and against Defendant for one-half of the value of 
the policy as of the May 12, 1989 date. 
2. Except as specifically clarified and amended 
herein, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce shall stand as signed and entered. 
Dated this £0 day of December, 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
Attorney for Defendant 
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